RIOT COMPENSATION MONIES “SPENT ON OTHER PROJECTS”

September 12, 2014

RIOT COMPENSATION MONIES “SPENT ON OTHER PROJECTS”

COMPENSATION MONIES given to Croydon council by the GLA to help victims of the 2011 riots in the borough were either siphoned off to other projects – or not given at all, say the new Labour administration.

The sweeping allegations – made by Cllr Toni Letts, Croydon’s cabinet member for economic development – follow a meeting between Croydon North MP Steve Reed and local businesses, victims and community leaders.

A statement on Steve Reed’s website says: “Three years after homes and businesses in Croydon’s London Road were ransacked and burnt to the ground, Croydon North MP Steve Reed has hosted a meeting to review progress towards recovery.

“Local businesses, community leaders and victims assessed how much of the support promised by the council, the Prime Minister and the Mayor of London has come through.

“The Croydon Riots Panel, set up by the council in 2011 after the riots, made 24 recommendations. Three years later not a single recommendation has been met in full.

“Business owners, including Trevor Reeves whose burning shop at Reeves Corner became an iconic image of the riots, expressed anger at the previous Tory council’s inaction.

“Despite pledges from the Prime Minister and Mayor of London to help make Croydon safer, the borough today has 50 fewer police officers on local streets, every police station in Croydon North has been closed down, and the promised police shop front on the London Road at the epicentre of rioting has never opened.

“Local residents and business owners complained about open drug dealing on the streets and gangs running Mafia-style protection rackets. “The borough’s new police commander, Ch Supt Andy Tarrant, promised to act on what he heard.

“Cllr Toni Letts, the council’s new economic development chief, confirmed that the £22.8m riots recovery fund received from the GLA had either not been spent or was syphoned off to other areas by the previous Tory council.

“She also stated that the GLA had threatened to take back the money because the previous council had failed to use it. The new council elected in May has started investing the money to improve pavements and shop fronts this week.

“Speaking after the meeting Steve Reed MP said: ‘The Tories have betrayed Croydon by breaking every single promise they made after the riots.

‘Not a single recommendation from their own riots panel has been fully implemented, we have fewer police when they promised us more, and millions of pounds earmarked to help the area recover has been left sitting in the bank or syphoned off into other areas.

‘The Tories at every level of Government have simply turned their backs on Croydon. ‘They were keen to be seen here in the days after the riots, but three years later we can see their only concern was grabbing the headlines not getting down to work’,”

– See more at: http://www.stevereedmp.co.uk/riots-betrayal-tories-break-every-promise-made-after-riots/#sthash.6yO7HTnY.dpuf

NOTE: News From Crystal Palace have asked both Cllr Letts (twice) and Steve Reed’s office (twice) for details of what other projects the money went on; they have asked the GLA press office (twice) and Cllr Fisher’s office (once) for their reactions to Steve Reed’s comments and have not received a reply from any of them.

RIOT PANEL REPORTS

Dateline March 2nd 2012

QUOTE: “Undertaking the review has, at times, been an unsettling experience. “The panel has met with many people whose homes, businesses and communities were destroyed or damaged by a relatively small number of criminals, who, for several hours, held areas of Croydon in a grip of fear, looting and wanton destruction.”

QUOTE: “The prime spark was the impression that people, particularly young men, could loot freely, and that impression was given by publicity of people looting unchallenged in Tottenham and subsequently other areas through television and other media throughout Sunday 7 August and Monday 8 August 2011.”

QUOTE:
“An area where the panel did hear criticism was that of delays in payments made under the Riot Damages Act. “The panel heard information regarding delays in payments and difficulties in procedures that took little or no account that some claimants could have had some or all of their documentation destroyed.
“The panel was particularly concerned regarding this point and noted that it had received no direct information that anyone inCroydon had received a payout under this Act by January 2012.”

RIOT PANEL REPORTS

THE PANEL set up to enquire into the causes of the riots in Croydon last August – and the lessons to be learnt – has delivered its report.
The report found:
*that the lack of police officers on duty, both across the Metropolitan Police Service and in Croydon in particular, played a significant part in the Croydon riots.
*with disorder taking place in at least 22 London boroughs it is clear to the panel that the Metropolitan Police Service is not resourced, and nor does it plan, to deal with public disorder across London on this scale.
*existing underlying tensions and disaffection were a causal factor in the rioting, and this included a number of issues around supporting both young people and their families.
That the riots in Croydon were NOT^ a protest against the police – but also that they would not have happened when they did if Mark Duggan had not been killed says the report.
*the impact of school holidays should be considered when looking at the amount of policing resource available on 8 August 2011
The report makes a total of 24 recommendations to both Croydon council and the Metropolitan Police. These include:
*That Croydon council gives consideration to improving its processes for gathering and assessing information from social media networks to improve its understanding of its local communities
*That the Metropolitan Police Service prioritises the rebuilding of trust and understanding between itself and young people and young adults in Croydon.
*That the Metropolitan Police Service gives consideration to how best to rebuild confidence in the wider community following the riots, particularly with regard to those communities that are historically disconnected from the police.
*the panel stresses that it is not attributing any blame to those officers who were making their best efforts to protect Croydon on 8 August 2011.

“On the contrary, the panel is keen to express its gratitude and thanks to all of the officers who worked for long hours at risk to their own personal safety trying to defend Croydon” says the report.
The Croydon independent review panel did not find that the riots were in themselves a protest against the police, but did agree that this was one of a range of underlying causal factors that were present before the riots took place.
That said, the panel did feel that this was a two way street and, while it did hear examples of areas where the police could do more to develop its relationship with some communities, it did also hear examples of where the police had tried to reach out to particular communities with little success.
“While the panel recognises that there is not an easy solution or ‘one size fits all’ approach to tackling underlying socio-economic problems, it did speak with people involved in a range of different schemes and services involved in this area of work.
“The panel was particularly impressed by those services that were multi-disciplinary in nature, which means that they looked at all the issues affecting an individual in the round, rather than just the one issue that brought them into contact with a professional public service.
“The panel noted that this is a new approach nationally and heard examples of services that brought together educationalists, housing officers, social care workers and other support services that worked to tackle all the issues relating to that family rather than just a parent or a child.
“The panel was also particularly impressed by those services that focused on early intervention before crime is committed and finds that those types of services are likely to help to prevent future rioting.”
When considering this subject, the panel was also informed of a range of services and provision made by community and voluntary sector groups. The panel did hear of examples of how these services were being used as part of integrated packages of support for families and felt that their involvement should be encouraged, it added.
Other longstanding issues of crime and disorder were repeatedly raised to the panel regarding North West Croydon, including drug and alcohol crime, gang crime including gangs based on ethnicity, street crime and fear of reporting crime and reprisals.
The panel is aware that both the police and other agencies are already familiar with these issues and indeed heard of efforts that had been made to tackle some of them.
But the panel still felt that those issues in North West Croydon would benefit from a refreshed impetus and momentum.
During the course of the review, the panel heard from a number of people who expressed the view that tensions between local communities and the police were a causal factor in the rioting. Those tensions ranged around a number of different issues, but within those issues were a number of specific matters that were repeatedly raised.
One such issue that the panel heard from a number of people was that the use of PCSOs (police community support officers) by the police was ineffective and a poor alternative to fully trained police officers. The panel considered this view and found that it was not a significant factor in therioting on 8 August 2011.
However, the panel did hear a range of information that suggested that the use of PCSOs may suit the characteristics and the population of some areas better than others. The panel also heard from a number of people regarding the working relationship between different communities and the police.
“The panel is fully aware of the range of efforts made by the police to engage with communities to develop relationships and build trust and confidence. “That said, given the number of people who considered this as a problem, the panel finds that it would be a helpful step for the police to reconsider how they manage these relationships, particularly with those people and groups that do not use traditional routes of access to communicate with public agencies.
“The panel is of the opinion that thorough detailed analysis of the people that chose to riot and why, must be undertaken as and when more information becomes available. Proper and full analysis of that information will help to understand who rioted and inform efforts to tackle pre-existing issues within the communities where the riots took place.
“Addressing the underlying tensions and disaffections that existed before the rioting will be an important task in trying to prevent rioting taking place in the future. “It will be of significant use for local agencies to be aware of which, if any, ethnic groups are over represented in the rioting when a full analysis is carried out.”
The panel also heard from a number of people who it met with who raised the question of whether Croydon had an adequate number of police officers generally. This question was raised in the context of specific geographic locations, particularly in the New Addington and London Road areas. A number of people who lived in those areas suggested that full time police stations in London Road and New Addington would help to reduce crime and disorder in those areas.
The panel also heard information regarding the overall level of policing resources in Croydon and the suggestion that Croydon should receive greater policing resources equivalent to those in the boroughs of Lewisham, Wandsworth and Islington.
The issue of protectionism was raised with regard to shops on London Road by a number of people who met with the panel. This issue was also raised with the Metropolitan Police Service and there was an acknowledgement that this was happening. The panel heard of specific efforts made by Croydon police to tackle this issue and difficulties that had been encountered when doing so.

WHY DID CROYDON SUFFER SUCH SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE?The level of rioting and looting in Croydon was very high when contrasted with other areas affected by rioting, in particular the physical damage caused to buildings by looters and arsonists. The disturbances in Croydon were also largely focused on looting, whereas disturbances in some other areas had greater elements of protest as well as looting.
A number of people who met with the panel have asked why this was the case. When addressing this question, one of the first points that thepanel considered was how Croydon fitted in with the rioting across the rest of London.
The resources available to the Metropolitan Police Service had been stretched over the weekend preceding the rioting in Croydon. The panelnoted that Croydon was one of the last areas to be subjected to rioting and looting. The panel has heard from some people that, because Croydon was one of the last areas to be hit, the ‘tank was dry’ in terms of policing resources available.
The panel has found that the lack of police officers on duty, both across the Metropolitan Police Service and in Croydon in particular, played a significant part in the Croydon riots. The Police did not have enough officers to carry out appropriate arrests on the night. In particular, the Police were unable to make arrests outside the cordons at either end of North End as between three and five officers would have been required for each arrest and the Police did not have sufficient numbers to make those arrests and maintain the cordons.
The period of around two and three quarter hours where rioters were relatively unchallenged contributed significantly to the level of damage as the rioters and looters had such a significant opportunity to get drawn into events, become excited and cause extended damage.
While making the above findings, the panel would like to stress that it is not attributing any blame to those officers who were making their best efforts to protect Croydon on 8 August 2011. On the contrary, the panel is keen to express its gratitude and thanks to all of the officers who worked for long hours at risk to their own personal safety trying to defend Croydon.
The panel found that, while there was some evidence that some people came into Croydon to loot, it was not the case that people came to Croydon en masse from across London to riot and loot.
In keeping with the question of whether rioters were Croydon residents or lived elsewhere, the panel was asked to consider whether Croydon’s location and good transport links were a key factor in the rioting.
The panel found the majority of rioters were Croydon residents, but does agree that Croydon’s location and transport links would have benefited those rioters and looters that travelled into the town centre from either other parts of Croydon or from outside the Borough.
The panel did consider the question of whether closing down the transport network earlier would have helped reduce the scale of disorder on 8 August 2011. Having considered a range of information on this question, the panel found that it would not have been likely to have made a significant difference.
“The reason for this is that the majority of rioters did not come to Croydon using the transport network and that a great number of people who were not involved in the rioting needed to use the transport network to come either into or out of Croydon to get home.”
With particular regard to stop and search, the panel heard from several sources that the need for stop and search was, in principle, accepted and that it played a significant role in reducing murder and knife crime. But experiences of the way in which stop and search had been conducted were cited as a cause of disaffection with the police.
To that end, the panel welcomed the Metropolitan Police commissioner’s recent announcement that stop and search tactics in London would be reformed and one chief superintendent’s assertion that funding had been secured for young people to speak with police officers about the impact of being stopped and searched.
A significant number of people also expressed views regarding parenting as a causal factor of the rioting. The panel heard that single parent families, discipline at home and general standards of parenting were all longer term causes of the disaffection that contributed to some people’s decision toriot and loot on 8 August 2011.
The panel considered this issue in detail and heard a range of information that supported the view that ‘chaotic’ and ‘disorganised’ family life could have a significant impact on a child’s life chances. However, the panel did hear that the number of parents actively involved in raising a child was a less significant factor than the quality of the parenting and family life that a child experienced.
The panel was particularly impressed by the targeted work being undertaken by the Turnaround Centre and by the Family Resilience team in order to address these issues. The panel also noted the historic issue of high rates of teenage pregnancy in Croydon, and the likelihood that teenage parents would have other social difficulties. The panel is aware that this, and issues around the quality of parenting, are long term issues for which there is not a quick solution.
In his foreword to the report – presented with ‘a sense of optimism and hope’ panel chairman William Barnett QC says the panel is fully aware that the recommendations in the report are made in a particularly difficult financial climate and is well aware of the difficulties that all public service providers in Croydon are facing.
“That said, the long term financial, emotional and reputational costs of the rioting far exceed the investment required to avoid as far as reasonably practicable rioting and looting happening in our town again.
“The recommendations that the panel has made are addressed to a number of different organisations and, on behalf of the Panel, I fully commend the contents of this report and its recommendations to each of those organisations and ask that they consider and accept them.
“Undertaking the review has, at times, been an unsettling experience. The panel has met with many people whose homes, businesses and communities were destroyed or damaged by a relatively small number of criminals, who, for several hours, held areas of Croydon in a grip of fear, looting and wanton destruction.
“That experience, though, has been offset by the many tales of heroism, bravery and resilience that we have also heard. “The panel has met with numerous people that risked their own safety to protect the communities that they live in.
“We have also heard from officers working for the police, fire brigade and Croydon council as well as members of the public about the brave efforts that they made to restore order in Croydon on 8 and 9 August 2011 and the enormous efforts made to help families and businesses recover in the days, weeks and months that followed.
“The panel has investigated the likely reasons for what happened in order to identify what should be done now to prevent similar events from happening again. “The nature of the panel’s work has led me to recall the words of the great Victorian judge, Baron Bramwell, who in a judgment that he delivered in 1869 said amongst other things that it would be ‘barbarous………..as I have often had occasion to tell juries, to hold that because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before.’
“In the spirit of those words, the panel has undertaken this review on the basis that it is all too easy to be wise after the event.”
(Note: The panel has made a positive decision to limit the length of the report to around 40 pages. “This is designed to encourage as many people as possible to read the report in full rather than rely on an executive summary.”

RIOTS – THE BACKGROUND
The killing of Trevor Ellis in South Croydon; 28 Properties set alight on 8 and 9 August 2011; 100 households displaced; 252 businesses directly affected’ 12 businesses are still yet to get back up and running (latest information available 13 January 2012)
One police officer injured The iconic Reeves Corner furniture store was destroyed The Co-op store in New Addington was closed until 15 December 2011 Significant travel disruption caused by damage to roads and tram lines. Reduced footfall throughout shopping centres following the rioting 416 arrests (latest information available 23 January 2012)186 convictions(latest information available 13 January 2012)
One of the Panel’s key terms of reference was to “record and place on the record what happened” in Croydon during the riots.
The report says it is important to set the rioting that took place in Croydon in the wider context of the rioting that took place across London and nationally between 6 and 10 August 2011.
“While this report is focused solely on what happened in Croydon, the panel’s review has heard a range of information regarding how the events that took place locally were influenced or connected to events that took place elsewhere in London. “This point is particularly relevant when the panelconsidered how pan-London agencies responded to the rioting in Croydon.
“When considering what happened in Croydon, it has been useful to the panel to establish what happened elsewhere before the rioting reached our town.”
The rioting began in the commercial centre of Tottenham on the evening of Saturday 6 August 2011 in the aftermath of a peaceful protest march that was organised following the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan on Thursday 4 August 2011. It quickly spread to Tottenham Hale Retail Park and looting was a key characteristic of the disturbances.
On 7 August 2011, further rioting and looting took place in the London districts of Brixton, Enfield, Islington, Wood Green and Oxford Circus in central London.
On 8 August 2011, rioting and looting in London took place in Balham, Barking, Barnet, Battersea, Bayswater, Bethnal Green, Camberwell, Camden, Catford, Charlton, Chelsea, Chingford, Chislehurst, Clapham Junction, Colliers Wood, Croydon, Ealing, East Dulwich, Enfield, Fulham, Hackney, Harlesden, Ilford, Islington, Lewisham, Notting Hill, Peckham, Romford, Streatham, Surrey Quays, Sutton, Tooting, Upminster, Walthamstow, Walworth Road and Woolwich.
Disturbance also began to spread outside London on 8 August 2011, with incidents being reported in Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Nottingham, Oxford and West Bromwich.
On the afternoon and evening of 9 August 2011, the number of police officers on duty in London was dramatically increased, peaking at 16,000, and incidences of rioting and looting were quickly brought to an end. Disturbances continued to spread nationally, with reports ofrioting starting to come from Essex, Gloucestershire, Luton, Liverpool, Manchester and Salford on Wednesday 10 August 2011.
Thursday 11 August saw the rioting subside nationally, with no further large scale disturbances reported.

RIOTS – THE TIMELINE IN CROYDON
Saturday 6 August 2011
Chief Superintendent Adrian Roberts, the then Croydon police Borough Commander, is deployed to command the public order response to the rioting and looting in Tottenham. The Deputy Borough Commander, Superintendent Jo Oakley, took command of policing in Croydon in Chief Superintendent Roberts’ absence.
Sunday 7 August 2011
The scale of events that took place on Monday 8 August has quite understandably detracted focus from the events of Sunday 7 August 2011, though it is the Panel’s opinion that these matters should be placed on record.
On Sunday 7 August, rioting and looting spread from Tottenham to a number of other areas across London. While there was not significantrioting in Croydon, there were a number of incidents that did take place. These included a number of semi-organised groups seeking to loot specific stores, mainly in the centre of Croydon, but also at least two stores on the Purley Way were targeted. The police, with some support from the council’s CCTV control room, managed these incidents and made a number of arrests.
Monday 8 August 2011
Monday 8 August was a warm summer’s day in Croydon and the weather remained warm and dry throughout.
At 9.00am on Monday 8 August 2011, the Croydon division of the Metropolitan Police held a local ‘Gold’ meeting. ‘Gold’ meetings are given this name by public sector plans for civil emergencies and are so called because they consider the highest level strategic issues. Gold group meetings are attended by the people in charge of public services to plan for or respond to emergencies. This particular Gold meeting was chaired by Superintendent Oakley and was attended by various other police officers and representatives of Croydon council. Amongst a range of other actions, the meeting considered what intelligence was available at that time and agreed that messages of public reassurance be given and that a visible police presence be maintained in the town centre.
Arrangements also began to be made to ensure that police officers had their ‘personal protective equipment’ with them and that there were enough police shields available for officers within the borough.
At 1.00pm a further Gold meeting was held, again chaired by Superintendent Oakley, to which representatives of the fire and ambulance services, British Transport Police and Surrey Police were also invited. At this meeting the developing intelligence picture was discussed and it was agreed that a highly visible police presence in the town centre be maintained; that petrol stations in the area be contacted to ask them not to sell fuel in containers and for all Police officers to remain on duty for the evening.
Following the conclusion of that Gold meeting, the Borough Commander of the Fire Brigade, Commander Chris Bigland, relocated to the council’s CCTV control room in order to co-ordinate any response required by the fire brigade.
Premises in the main town centre shopping area began to close early during the course of the afternoon, some on the advice of the police.
Between 4.00pm and 5.00pm, large groups of people began to gather in North End in Croydon town centre. All level two public order trained police officers had already been redeployed from Croydon to other areas in London, either during the course of the weekend or earlier that day. ‘Level two public order trained’ refers to police officers that have undertaken a higher level of training on how to deal with public order incidents.
It follows that the police officers present in Croydon Town Centre were not level two public order trained officers at this stage, says thereport. Looting of some stores in Whitgift Shopping Centre and on London Road had begun by 4.30pm.
Between 5.00pm and 6.00pm, more groups of people gathered in Croydon town centre and reports of looting and disorder became more common, including incidents spreading to Surrey Street, and by around 6.00pm both ends of North End had been cordoned off by police.
At around 6.25pm police officers started to come under attack from people gathered in the West Croydon and wider London Road area who were armed with makeshift weapons and projectiles. One unprotected PCSO was injured and required hospital treatment. Further arrangements were made for police shields to be gathered from across the borough for use by police officers in the town centre.
The call for reinforcements was made by police in Croydon to the Metropolitan Police Central Command at 7.01pm.
Between 6.45pm and 9.15pm, large scale looting and disorder took place in the West Croydon, London Road and Surrey Street areas. Looting in the Purley Way area escalated from 6.00pm and continued until 11.30pm.Around 7.30pm the first arson took place in the London Road area when a solicitors’ office at 76 London Road was set alight. This was followed by the Somerfields store on London Road being set alight around 8.00pm and then by the torching of a bus on Tamworth Road at around 8.30pm. This was shortly followed by an arson attack on the pawnbrokers on the corner of London Road and Oakfield Road.After rioters and looters began to start fires, the police and fire Services worked together to push back rioters to allow officers to attend the fires and ensure that people were not trapped inside the burning buildings.Rioters and looters attacked both police and fire officers while they were trying to attend fires.At 7.45pm, Chief Inspector Nanji took operational control of the policing of the riots, known in the police as ‘Silver Command’, from Inspector Scrivener.At around 8.45pm, the Lidl supermarket on London Road was also set alight and at some time between 8.30pm and 8.45pm the House of Reeves furniture store at Reeves Corner was looted and set alight, pictures of which were seen around the world. Consistent rioting and looting spread east of London Road, in the area north of St James’s Road / Lower Addiscombe Road along White Horse Road from 9.00pm, with incidents continuing until around 3.00am.The first level two public order trained police reinforcements began to arrive in Croydon from 9.15pm.Chief Superintendent Musker, a member of the Metropolitan Police Senior Public Order Cadre and then Wandsworth Borough Commander, arrived in Croydon at this time to take over ‘Silver Command’ of the policing of the disorder.Between 9.15pm and around 11.15pm, large scale looting and riotingcontinued in central Croydon and South Croydon. After 11.15pm, rioting and looting began to subside but continued in a more sporadic nature until around 3.00am.The council opened a rest centre at 10.30pm at Taberner House to provide a place of refuge for people whose homes had been affected by the trouble.The planning for the recovery began at 11.40pm, when Croydon council established a Local Authority Gold group meeting to plan the immediate recovery actions required.At 5.30am on the morning of Tuesday 9 August 2011, the clean up operation in the town centre began. All streets not subject to a police cordon were cleaned by 7.50am. Dangerous structures officers began to assess damaged buildings on London Road from 5.45am.At 9.00am on Tuesday 9 August 2011, Superintendent Lawrie replaced Chief Superintendent Musker as the Police ‘Silver Command’.

RIOTS – THE RECOVERY
The panel heard very little, if any, criticism of statutory agencies response following the rioting on 8 August 2011 – and a great deal of praise for the way in which agencies and local communities responded to the riots and helped and supported people living and working in their communities.
The recovery from the rioting began at 11.40pm on Monday 8 August 2011 when Croydon council established a Local Authority Gold group meeting. That meeting established two teams to focus on the immediate actions to be taken over the next 24 hours and then what needed to be done after that.
In the immediate aftermath of the riots, there were three primary areas of recovery work undertaken, namely providing housing and social care to those persons made homeless by the riots; dealing with the physical effects of the riots in terms of securing damaged buildings and cleaning the affected areas; and supporting businesses that were affected by the rioting.
Displaced Households: On the night of 8 August 2011, a total of 100 households were displaced by the rioting. Some of these people either lost their homes because of the fires or could not return home due to loss of electricity.
In total, 47 households received bed and breakfast placements via the council’s housing team. 38 households were able to return home and 15 households obtained alternative accommodation via their own means or with support from their landlords. By 30 September 2011, all but nine households had moved into new permanent accommodation.
Of the nine households that had not, four had received offers at that time and have now moved into their permanent accommodation. Five were subject to Home Office investigations into their immigration status. A total of £93,000 in additional welfare payments was distributed to the affected households and additional support was provided by replacing essential household goods and working with charities for the homeless to provide furniture and other household items.
A number of households required access to benefits and welfare support as a result of the rioting and the council organised dedicated support for these people to help prioritise their applications. A temporary ‘one stop shop’ was established by the council in the CVA building on London Road, which provided dedicated support and advice to families and businesses affected by the riots. The council and the Department for Work and Pensions worked together to support those people made unemployed by the riots and to prioritise their claims.
Highways and Buildings:The operation to clean roads and streets affected by rioting began at 5.30am on 9 August 2011 and was completed in central Croydon by 7.50am that day. Local volunteers began further clean ups on 10 August 2011 in West Croydon, and these volunteers were joined by council contractors who also supplied gloves, brooms and refuse sacks.
All roads were immediately open, save for a section of London Road and Reeves Corner that were both crime scenes. These areas needed significant work as fire damage had destroyed the road surface, traffic lights and road signs and the fire damaged buildings posed a potential threat to pedestrians and traffic. A couple of people that met with the panel did mention that there had been small delays in making repairs to road signs in the Reeves Corner area.
Two highways officers were dedicated to recovery works and diversion routes were established immediately. The council worked with Transport for London to undertake all necessary works to make these roads safe and Reeves Corner was fully reopened on 16 August 2011 and London Road was fully reopened on 4 September 2011.
The tram line passing Reeves Corner was also damaged by the fire and tram services through central Croydon were unable to operate from 9 August 2011. Transport for London staff and contractors worked round the clock to repair and replace the line and full tram services were reinstated on Friday 12 August 2011.
Supporting Affected Businesses: From 19 August 2011, daily business briefings were held in the town centre to brief business owners on the support being made available to them and to allow issues to be raised with officers. The council also established a dedicated business hotline to allow affected businesses to speak to specialist support.
One-off grant funds of £1,000 were distributed to 249 businesses to assist with immediate cash flow issues and to help with repairs following the riots. In addition, business rate discounts were also given to each of these businesses and an interest free loan scheme was also put in place.
Council officers visited businesses in affected areas on a door-to-door basis to promote awareness of the available schemes and to offer support in making insurance claims either via insurers or under the Riot Damages Act scheme.
On 20 and 21 August 2011, Croydon council and Transport for London held an event to encourage shoppers back into Croydon which included free parking and free tram travel.
The Metropolitan Police Service maintained a highly visible presence in town and district centres to ensure that there was no further resurgence of the unrest. Neighbourhood enforcement officers (council officers that investigate anti-social behaviour and environmental crime) were redeployed to town and district centres for three weeks after the riots to support colleagues and police teams.
As part of its longer term response, the council has introduced free 30 minute parking spaces and additional bays in London Road to encourage the economic recovery in this area.
Other Recovery Measures: A range of measures were also undertaken to help the wider community recovery from the rioting. Open support sessions were held in Sumner Road for people affected by the rioting in the immediate days following 8 August. A number of public meetings were held in the areas affected by the rioting and were attended by the police and the council and a number of specific meetings were also held to engage with young people across Croydon.
A late night call centre was opened in the days following the riots to help co-ordinate public volunteers and council officers worked with volunteers to help arrange the distribution of donations made by the public to households affected by the rioting. The council worked with Croydon Voluntary Action (the CVA) to direct people that wanted to volunteer following the riots.
A publicity campaign was organised by the council in partnership with the police, with posters being displayed asking for help identifying suspected rioters and later publicising the numbers of people arrested. This was followed by the ‘I love Croydon’ campaign designed to promote the many positive things about living and working in Croydon.
An area where the panel did hear criticism was that of delays in payments made under the Riot Damages Act. The panel heard information regarding delays in payments and difficulties in procedures that took little or no account that some claimants could have had some or all of their documentation destroyed.
The panel was particularly concerned regarding this point and noted that it had received no direct information that anyone in Croydon had received a payout under this Act by January 2012.

RIOTS – FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

WAS THERE INTELLIGENCE THAT CROYDON WOULD BE TARGETED?
In looking at the response by the police, the panel says the first issues to deal with relate to what actions the police took before the riotingactually started in Croydon. “It is useful at this stage to clarify what is meant by the ‘police’. The Metropolitan Police Service is responsible for policing across London as a whole. Croydon Police is a division of the Metropolitan Police Service.
The rioting in Croydon was part of a widespread problem taking place across London and because of this, the panel has had to look at decisions that were taken locally by Croydon police and also centrally by the Metropolitan Police Service.
“The first of these issues is what intelligence was available to the police that Croydon would be targeted by rioters. “The panel has spent some time looking at what information was available to the police that may have indicated that Croydon would be subjected to the rioting.
“It is clear that the Metropolitan Police Service had information that every London borough, including Croydon, could come under attack on 8 August 2011. “This information was considered locally by Croydon police. However, the panel recognises that there is a clear distinction between ‘intelligence’ and ‘information’ and that there are significant difficulties in assessing the quality of information that was being communicated across various social media networks.
The panel has found that the sheer volume of information regarding potential riots across London on 7 and 8 August made it almost impossible for the Metropolitan Police to assess what information was or was not reliable or should have been prioritised.
“On the information that was available to Croydon police before the rioting began, which the panel has heard about, the panel finds that this was acted on when practicable to do so bearing in mind the lack of police officers available.”
One of these actions was to put in place an order to exercise additional stop and search powers under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. That order was put in place by Croydon police from 1.00pm on 8 August 2011 as a direct response to intelligence that the police had received and assessed.
The panel finds that there was no information or intelligence available at the Gold meetings (of police officers and council representatives) that suggested that rioting and looting would take place on the scale that it did.

WERE ACTIONS TAKEN QUICKLY ENOUGH?

The first Croydon Gold meeting was convened by Croydon police on Monday 8 August at 9.00am. It was chaired by the deputy borough commander, Superintendent Oakley, and attended by a range of police officers and council representatives. “The panel has seen the minutes of this meeting and the information that was available at that time. Having considered what information there was and what actions were agreed, the panel finds that at this stage it appears that there was nothing that ought to have been done that was not done.” At 1.00pm that day, a further Croydon Gold group meeting was convened by the police. The panel can see from the record of this meeting that preventative actions were being taken, but that clearly no-one expected the scale of problems that took place in Croydon on that evening and that the information available at that stage did not suggest that there would be such large scale problems.The panel has spoken with people who run businesses in Croydon and has heard various accounts as to whether they were advised to close their businesses early. Based on the information that is available to the panel, it has found that those businesses based outside the immediate town centre shopping area were unlikely to have received updated advice from either the police or the council during the course of 8 August 2011.

Everyone accepts that, in the event, there were not enough police officers on duty to deal with the rioting across London and this also applies to Croydon. To a significant degree, this lack of numbers, both across London and locally, influenced what happened on 8 August 2011. Thepanel has considered a number of possible actions that could have been taken both before and after the rioting had begun but has been left with the reality that such possibilities were not an option on the night because of the lack of available policing resources. The panel has also asked why there was a lack of available policing resources both in Croydon and across the Metropolitan Police Service.

WHY WAS THE BOROUGH COMMANDER MOVED?

A number of witnesses asked the panel why the borough’s then police commander, Chief Superintendent Roberts, was taken away fromCroydon over the weekend immediately prior to 8 August 2011. Having looked into this matter, the panel can see that Chief Superintendent Roberts was deployed as ‘Silver Command’ for the incidents in Tottenham as a matter of routine. The Metropolitan Police Service maintains a rota of public order command trained officers and, on Saturday 6 August 2011, Chief Superintendent Roberts was the ‘on call’ officer for that role. As a consequence of this, he was called to take central command of the rioting after it had broken out in Tottenham. The Panel has also considered whether a similarly trained officer, with Public Order Command training, should have been deployed to Croydon to replace the Chief Superintendent. The Deputy Borough Commander, Superintendent Oakley, was not level 2 public order trained or a public order command trained officer.At the time when Chief Superintendent Roberts was moved, the Metropolitan Police Service did not have any intelligence that suggested that Croydon was such a specific risk that a similarly trained officer would need to be deployed to Croydon to replace him and in any event the panel does not know if such an Officer was available.

WERE THERE ENOUGH POLICE OFFICERS IN CROYDON?

The second question that has been raised is whether there were enough police officers in Croydon on 8 August 2011, specifically level 2 trained public order officers. One of the reasons why some people feel that there were not enough police officers on duty in Croydon is because all Croydon’s level 2 trained public order officers had been moved elsewhere in London over the course of the preceding weekend and on Monday 8 August 2011 itself. Again, the Panel has looked carefully into this issue. The level 2 public order trained police officers were moved out of Croydon to central command as per the Metropolitan Police Service’s mobilisation plan as it was in early August 2011. That plan lays down the process that the police should follow in the event of large scale incidents. In that sense, the Metropolitan Police were following their process and doing what they were supposed to do. The panel has also questioned whether the Police Mobilisation Plan took into account the risk factors for each borough when considering which areas resources should be called from. Some people have suggested that in the light of the incidents that took place on the night of 7 August 2011, Croydon’s large shopping centre, socio-economic problems in the north of the borough and existing levels of crime should have highlighted Croydon as high risk when considering which areas the riotingcould spread to. On that basis, some people have argued that Croydon should not have had its policing resources deployed elsewhere across London. When looking at this issue in the context of the riots on 8 August 2011, the panel has had to bear in mind that there were not enough police resources available across London to deal with the widespread scale of the disorder. The panel has not received enough information to be able to conclude whether such risk factors were considered or not but, the panel does conclude that these factors should have been considered when the Metropolitan Police Service was considering which areas to move policing resources from.

SHOULD THESE DECISIONS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED?

While the panel has seen that the police were following the established procedure at the time the decisions were taken to move the borough commander and level two public order trained officers, it has also considered whether the Metropolitan Police Service should have reviewed these decisions when the scale of the disorder began to spread across London. When looking at this issue, the panel was particularly mindful of the number of people who raised questions regarding the command of Croydon police over the course of 8 and 9 August 2011. It is clear to the Panel that the rioting only began to be brought under control following the arrival of level 2 public order trained officers at 9.15pm. Those reinforcements included the arrival of Chief Superintendent Musker, who is also a public order command trained officer. Chief SuperintendentMusker took command of the operational policing response (‘Silver’ command) immediately upon arrival. Before that time, at least two other officers, an inspector and a chief inspector, had been in command of the operational police response to the rioting in Croydon. While the paneldoes not have enough information to reasonably conclude that the presence of a public order command trained officer would have prevented the rioting, it observes that the rioting was only brought under control once a public order trained commander and public order trained officers had been brought in to respond to the disorder. Though the panel can see that the redeployment of both Chief Superintendent Roberts and the level 2 trained public order officers were entirely in keeping with the process that the police were following at that time, the panel does find that removing

all Level 2 public order trained officers was not the best course of action in the event and in the light of what was transpiring across London.The panel considers it sensible that future mobilisation plans identify and take account of the range of circumstances when a minimum number of such officers should be left in their home boroughs and that additional risk assessments be undertaken when incidents spread over wider areas. That the police were outnumbered by rioters was not just an issue in Croydon, the Metropolitan Police Service has stated that this was the case across London as a whole. When questioning whether reinforcements were called quickly enough, the Panel has had to consider this in two stages. The first is at the local level, where Croydon Police would call for reinforcements by contacting the central command of the Metropolitan Police Service for reinforcements to be sent from elsewhere within the Service. The second stage is at the pan-London level, where the Metropolitan Police Service as a whole can seek reinforcements either informally from neighbouring forces or formally through the ‘Mutual Aid’ system.

DID CROYDON POLICE CALL FOR REINFORCEMENTS QUICKLY ENOUGH?

The police records show that reinforcements were first called for at 7.01pm and this was approximately 35 minutes after police started to come under attack. Reinforcements eventually began to arrive approximately two and a quarter hours later at 9.15pm. The panel has questioned why reinforcements were not sought sooner by Croydon police. It is unclear as to the exact time that police officers were outnumbered, but gatherings and looting began to escalate between 5.30pm and 6.00pm. As there were no level two public order trained officers in the borough at that time, Croydon police were aware that they only had sufficient resources to contain a small number of incidents. The panel finds that it was an error of judgement by Croydon police for public order trained officers not to have been sought earlier. In making this finding, the panelis aware that it does not have sufficient information to say whether or not Croydon police had informally sought reinforcements any earlier than the recorded time of 7.01pm. The panel would have liked to have heard from other police officers that were in command of Croydon police prior to 9.15pm. Despite this, during the course of this review, the Metropolitan Police Service nominated Chief Superintendent Musker, who by that time had become the permanent Borough Commander for Croydon, to represent their service as a whole and he was unfortunately in no position to answer the panel’s question on this subject because he had not been present in Croydon before 9.15pm an 8 August 2011.

COULD THE ‘MET’ HAVE SOUGHT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE SOONER?

The panel has specifically considered whether the Metropolitan Police Service requested assistance from other police forces quickly enough. Police forces can normally seek assistance through two different routes. The first is to informally ask neighbouring forces for assistance; the second is to submit a formal request for ‘Mutual Aid’ through a nationally co-ordinated scheme. Over the course of 6 and 7 August 2011, the Metropolitan Police Service central command sought and received informal assistance from neighbouring forces, and the panel heard first hand accounts of officers from other forces being present in Tottenham in the early hours of 7 August 2011 following the initial disturbances. Thepanel sees that formal assistance was sought by the Metropolitan Police Service through the ‘Mutual Aid’ scheme on Monday 8 August 2011 at 9.30am. The panel also heard that the Metropolitan Police Service has only previously used the Mutual Aid scheme on a pre-planned basis, and has never before sought aid during an ongoing incident. While noting that the Metropolitan Police Service is not resourced to respond to the level of disorder that took place over the course of 6-8 August 2011, the panel must then naturally ask whether ‘Mutual Aid’ should have been sought sooner and whether more thorough risk assessments on 7 August 2011 would have assisted the Metropolitan Police Service in deciding to make the decision to formally ask for help sooner. The panel does recognise that the rioting across London on 6 and 7 August 2011 happened quickly and, to a greater or lesser extent, the spreading of the disorder was not expected. With that in mind, the panel is aware that the time frame in which Mutual Aid could have been obtained any sooner than it was is likely to have been a matter of hours. That said, thepanel is particularly mindful that Croydon police had to wait for two and a quarter hours for reinforcements to arrive after they were requested from the Metropolitan Police Service central command and that it was during this period that the majority of damage and looting took place inCroydon.

The panel has not received sufficient information to make a fair conclusion on why Mutual Aid was not formally requested sooner, but on the face of the limited information available, the panel concludes that had Mutual Aid been formally sought and obtained earlier by the Metropolitan Police Service, it could have helped limit the extent of rioting and looting that took place in Croydon. It was an error of judgement that the Metropolitan Police Service did not seek reinforcements through the ‘Mutual Aid’ scheme earlier.

DID THE POLICE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM FAIL?

The panel has heard conflicting opinions on this matter and does not have sufficient information to reach a firm conclusion. That said, the paneldid hear from several sources of the difficulties being encountered by the police officer present at the CCTV control room in communicating with the police command and, to that end, the panel does find that consideration should be given to improving the system for police officers to communicate with their command from the Council CCTV control room during major incidents.

WERE THE POLICE PROTECTING THE WHITGIFT CENTRE ANDCENTRALE?

When meeting with people that were directly affected by the riots, the panel has heard a number of people express the view that the police appeared to protect the main shopping centres and allowed the rioters and looters to have free reign in West Croydon. The panel has looked into this suggestion very carefully and has taken into account the views of local residents and shopkeepers as well as the police and other agencies. From the information available, the panel has found that following attempts to loot shops in Centrale, the Whitgift Centre and Allders, the police created a cordon at either end of North End. Those attacks on these shopping centres took place at the beginning of the disorder and the police, at that stage, took the decision to clear North End of the people that were gathering there and to establish the cordon. The physical geography of the town centre meant that there are only a limited number of places where a cordon could be created without the riotersand looters being able to use side streets to work their way in behind the police line. After establishing that cordon, the police did not have sufficient resources to safely push the rioters either further back or to make targeted arrests until reinforcements arrived some two and a quarter hours later. In order to make arrests of rioters outside the cordon, between three and five police officers would be required for each rioter arrested. There were not sufficient police officers available before at least 9.15pm for the police to safely break their lines to make individual arrests. In the event, the police line was moved after buildings started to be torched, in order to secure the safety of fire fighters attending those fires and to allow searches of those buildings to be undertaken, in case people were trapped inside. The police were left with little option but to take this course of action and did so at great personal risk as it left the police line exposed to attack from the rear until reinforcements began to arrive at 9.15pm. The panel did not find that the police had taken any deliberate decision to protect the main shopping centres at the cost of other areas and nor were they ordered to do so by any other outside party. The panel concluded that retail units on London Road were mainly targeted as looters had been pushed back from North End by the police.

WHY DID PEOPLE RIOT IN CROYDON?

The question of why people rioted in Croydon does not have a single straightforward answer, say the panel. One section of thereport deals with various reasons and hypothesis that have been suggested to the panel and detail the panel’s findings on this question. In the first instance, a great many people have asked the panel whether the rioting in Croydon had anything to do with the protest that had taken place in Tottenham on Saturday 6 August 2011 following the killing of Mark Duggan. Dealing with this question at the outset, the panel has looked at all the information available and has found that the riots in Croydon were not a protest against the police but also that they would not have happened

when they did if Mr Duggan had not been killed. In Croydon there was comparatively little direct confrontation with the police. The riots in Croydon primarily involved destruction of premises and consequent looting and harassment and intimidation of local law abiding people. While the panel has found that the rioting in Croydon would not have happened when it did if Mark Dugganhad not been killed, the panel does not consider that this was the sole spark that set off the rioting in Croydon. The prime spark was the impression that people, particularly young men, could loot freely, and that impression was given by publicity of people looting unchallenged in Tottenham and subsequently other areas through television and other media throughout Sunday 7 August and Monday 8 August 2011. Over that weekend, a great many people saw images and heard reports that suggested that there was an opportunity to loot with the appearance of no consequences, that mob rule had taken control of parts of London and this gave temptation to people to riot. Furthermore, the panel found that this prime spark, without some addition to it, was not enough to set off the riots in Croydon. The panel found that a range of other pre-existing issues and conditions had to be in place including poverty; lack of opportunity; poor living conditions; poor environmental conditions; stop and search; levels of unemployment and the numbers of young people not in education, employment or training.

WAS CROYDON TARGETED BY CRIMINALS FROM ACROSS LONDON?

From the outset of the review, the panel heard contributions from a range of persons who felt that Croydon was targeted for looting by a core of organised criminals on 8 August 2011. The panel has given this point careful attention when meeting with residents, business owners and agencies and when considering the facts that are known at this stage. While the panel has heard first hand accounts of higher volumes of people at Croydon train stations, people being sighted making their way into the town centre and of different faces being present in the London Road area, it has weighed this information against the latest available data that has been provided by the Metropolitan Police. That information shows that 64.41pr cent of identified suspects (latest information available 12 December 2011) involved in the rioting in Croydon lived in the London borough of Croydon. In keeping with the question of whether rioters were Croydon residents or lived elsewhere, the panel was asked to consider whether Croydon’s location and good transport links were a key factor in the rioting. The Panel found that the majority of rioters wereCroydon residents, but does agree that Croydon’s location and transport links would have benefited those rioters and looters that travelled into the town centre from either other parts of Croydon or from outside the borough. The panel did consider the question of whether closing down the transport network earlier would have helped reduce the scale of disorder on 8 August 2011. Having considered a range of information on this question, the panel finds that it would not have been likely to have made a significant difference. The reason for this is that the majority of rioters did not come to Croydon using the transport network and that a great number of people who were not involved in the rioting needed to use the transport network to come either into or out of Croydon to get home

WHY DID CROYDON SUFFER SUCH SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE?

The level of rioting and looting in Croydon was very high when contrasted with other areas affected by rioting, in particular the physical damage caused to buildings by looters and arsonists. The disturbances in Croydon were also largely focused on looting, whereas disturbances in some other areas had greater elements of protest as well as looting. When addressing this question, one of the first points the panel had to consider was how Croydon fitted in with the rioting across the rest of London. The resources available to the Metropolitan Police Service had been stretched over the weekend preceding the rioting in Croydon and the panel has noted that Croydon was one of the last areas to be subjected to rioting and looting. The panel has heard from some people that, because Croydon was one of the last areas to be hit, the ‘tank was dry’ in terms of policing resources available. The panel has found that the lack of police officers on duty, both across the Metropolitan Police Service and in Croydon in particular, played a significant part in the Croydon riots. The police did not have enough officers to carry out appropriate arrests on the night. In particular, the police were unable to make arrests outside the cordons at either end of North End as between three and five officers would have been required for each arrest and the police did not have sufficient numbers to make those arrests and maintain the cordons. The period of around two and three quarter hours where rioters were relatively unchallenged contributed significantly to the level of damage as the rioters and looters had such a significant opportunity to get drawn into events, become excited and cause extended damage. While making the above findings, the panel would like to stress that it is not attributing any blame to those officers who were making their best efforts to protect Croydon on 8 August 2011. On the contrary, the panel is keen to express its gratitude and thanks to all of the officers who worked for long hours at risk to their own personal safety trying to defend Croydon.